

The United Nations Security Council



AGENDA:

Addressing terrorism and warfare as the onsets of regional destabilization following the recent tragedy in Kashmir

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Letter From Executive Board

It is with great enthusiasm that we welcome you to the United Nations Security Council at the Shishukunj International School Model United Nations Conference 2025. Serving as your Executive Board, we are honored to facilitate this simulation on the agenda, "Addressing terrorism and warfare as the onsets of regional destabilization post the recent tragedy in Kashmir."

The Security Council is the most powerful committee in the entirety of the United Nations and is the only committee that has the power to command others, thus every one of the 30 delegates of the Council must understand the gravitas, honour, and responsibility you have been given of representing your respective countries in this session of the Security Council. The Security Council was established on October 24, 1945, with the establishment of the United Nations. The composition, functions, power, voting, and procedure of the UNSC have been listed under Chapter V, Articles 23 to 32 of the UN Charter.

As stated by its mandate[1], the Security Council investigates and takes action against all conflicts that can lead to international friction. Therefore, preventing further escalation of armed conflict in Southern Asia after the launch of Pakistani Operation Bunyan Marsus becomes mandatory. The Security Council has convened in many closed-door sessions after the Pahalgam Massacre, but none have had a satisfactory result. As we sit together on May 10, 2025, at 9:30 a.m. in this crucial UNSC emergency closed-door session, our ultimate goal is to campaign for international peace and security.

The bureau expects the delegates to bring interesting debate and comprehensive solutions to the committee. To the executive board, the growth and development of the delegates matters the most. We are living in the era of Artificial Intelligence, therefore, it is not practically possible for us to keep it completely separated from the MUN. AI should be used only for formatting and refining your original ideas. Any delegate who brings up a point directly copied and pasted from an LLM response will face appropriate consequences.

The study guide has been made to give you a base-level understanding of the agenda. After going thoroughly through the study guide, you will be able to understand the dynamics of the agenda, which will be helpful in your utilization of further research in the committee. The agenda has a lot of misinformation going around about it, therefore, the bureau will only consider points conveyed with a base of a formal source.

We look forward to fruitful debates and directives filled with comprehensive solutions that are unanimously created while considering international law, the UN Charter, foreign policies, and the ideals of all countries.

Feel free to contact us with any questions. Arham Sethi, Chairperson Siddhant Saraf, Vice Chairperson

^{1:} https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/what-securitycouncil#:~:text=MANDATE,meet%20whenever%20peace%20is%20threatened



About the Committee

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the principal organ of the United Nations responsible for maintaining international peace and security. It comprises 5 permanent states - the Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China, the United States of America, the French Republic, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Apart from its 5 permanent states, it has several changing temporary member states.

The responsibility of maintaining international peace and security extends to addressing threats to it caused by terrorism and warfare. It extends to paving pathways for peace in the conflicted region through international interventions, strategies, and shifting power dynamics. UNSC has developed a broad approach to the fight against terrorism. It includes multiple resolutions and the establishment of expert committees to oversee and improve global actions in this area. Of particular importance, the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC - created post-September 11 attacks) and its executive directorate, the CTED (Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate), play an essential supportive role in encouraging all member states to put into practice Security Council resolutions. Such bodies also reinforce the ability of states to fight terrorism internally and regionally in an effective manner. The authority of the UNSC in counter-terrorism is significant, as it operates under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, rendering its resolutions legally binding on member states. The CTC's mandate to monitor implementation and build state capacity underscores the UN's comprehensive approach to tackling this global challenge.

However, the current situation in southern Asia depicts the failure of UNSC frameworks in addressing terrorism in practice. The situation has escalated from a terror attack in Pahalgam to warfare between India and Pakistan. The world calls upon the UNSC to comply to its mandate by intervening in the situation and campaigning for peace. Through past experiences, it is quite clear that opt-in compliance resolutions don't work. A resolution in a 2025 UNSC session should be made in a way that enforces compliance when passed. In this UNSC session, the member states will have to orchestrate their individual actions in a way which re-establishes peace and security, recovers bilateral treaties that upheld stability, and de-escalate warfare.

The freeze date of the committee is 10 May, 9:30 a.m.





Introduction To Agenda

Terror activities in the South-Asian region over the past few years have shaped the geopolitical landscape significantly. The agenda "Addressing terrorism and warfare as the onsets of regional destabilization following the recent tragedy in Kashmir" expounds the critical analysis of the coaction of counter-terrorism responses and bilateral treaties that shape the region with special emphasis on the aftermath of the Kashmir tragedy.

Terrorists attacked civilians near Pahalgam on 22 April 2025, killing 26 tourists and wounding 20 in one of the deadliest assaults in recent Kashmir history. The Resistance Front, believed to be an offshoot of Lashkar-e-Taiba, initially claimed responsibility before retracting its statement. This atrocity renewed fears of cross-border militancy and underscored the vulnerability of civilian populations in Jammu and Kashmir.

In response, India conducted precise air strikes on 7 May 2025 under Operation Sindoor against nine reported terrorist camps in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Pakistan decried the attacks as aggression and threatened a rapid response, later launching Operation Bunyan al-Marsus with aerial and missile strikes against Indian military facilities. Both escalated by suspending major bilateral processes, such as visa facilitations and trade corridors, creating a pattern of tit-for-tat retaliation.

Bilateral frameworks like the Simla Agreement and the Indus Waters Treaty were designed to anchor Indo-Pak cooperation but have been weaponized during military escalations. Unilateral counter-terror operations bypassing diplomatic channels have undermined mutual trust and rendered these treaties ineffective in de-escalating conflict. Renewed acrimony has turned legal instruments into diplomatic leverage rather than platforms for collaboration.

Both India and Pakistan remain nuclear-armed, and their leaders' bellicose rhetoric has raised fears of inadvertent escalation to nuclear use. Military analysts warn that rapid tit-for-tat strikes near forward deployment areas risk miscalculation, which could trigger a catastrophic exchange.

The crisis has rapidly attracted major powers, each acting on different interests. China has called for restraint, interested in protecting its Belt and Road investments in Pakistan while holding true to its non-interference principle. Russia has been a votary of diplomatic discourse, using its defense relationship with India and its larger Eurasian ambition. While that is taking place, Turkey and Iran have emphasized the humanitarian cost, warning that sectarian strains run the risk of spilling outside Kashmir. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have demanded confidence-building measures for securing critical energy and trade arteries. These reactions combined highlight the way that the Kashmir standoff has become a test case for global alignments, regional power, and the strength of the rules-based order.

1947: Partition of British India and First Kashmir War. India and Pakistan gain independence. The princely state of Jammu and Kashmir's accession to India sparks the First Indo-Pakistani War. A UN-mediated ceasefire in 1949 establishes a temporary border, later known as the Line of Control (LoC), dividing Kashmir.

September 19, 1960: Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) Signed. Brokered by the World Bank, this treaty between India and Pakistan governs the sharing of the Indus River system's waters.

1963 : Sino-Pakistan Frontier Agreement. Pakistan cedes a portion of Pakistani-administered Kashmir (Shaksgam Valley) to China. This agreement makes China a third party in the Kashmir dispute and lays groundwork for future connectivity projects.

1965: Second Indo-Pakistani War. Tensions escalate into another conflict over Kashmir, ending in a UN-brokered ceasefire with no territorial changes. Tashkent Declaration signed.

1971: Third Indo-Pakistani War and Bangladesh Liberation. Conflict in East Pakistan leads to its independence as Bangladesh, triggering a third war between India and Pakistan.

July 2, 1972: Simla Agreement Signed. Following the 1971 war, India and Pakistan sign this peace treaty aimed at normalizing relations and resolving disputes bilaterally. It converts the 1971 ceasefire line into the Line of Control (LoC), emphasizing that neither side will unilaterally alter it.

Late 1980s - Early 1990s :

- Formation of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). A Pakistan-based Islamist militant group founded by Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, initially operating in Jammu and Kashmir with the ultimate goal of establishing Muslim rule over the Indian subcontinent.
- Various militant groups were also formed like Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF).
- Influx of Militants and Exodus of Kashmiri Pandits. The withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan leads to an influx of battle-hardened militants and sophisticated weaponry into Kashmir, further fueling the insurgency.

2003: Balochistan Insurgency Resurges. A low-level conflict commences in Pakistan's Balochistan province, driven by Baloch nationalists seeking greater autonomy or independence, continuing to the present day. Pakistan frequently accuses India of supporting this insurgency.

September 16, 2006: Decision to institutionalize India-Pakistan Joint Anti-Terrorism Mechanism (JATM). During a meeting in Havana, Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh and President General Pervez Musharraf decide to create this mechanism to identify and implement counter-terrorism initiatives and investigations.

November 26, 2008: Mumbai Terror Attacks. Ten gunmen, identified as members of Lashkare-Taiba (LeT), carry out a series of coordinated attacks across Mumbai, killing 166 people.





2013/2014 onwards: Initiation and Development of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). As a flagship project of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), CPEC involves massive infrastructure investments in Pakistan, including roads, railways, and energy projects. A significant portion of CPEC passes through Gilgit-Baltistan, a part of Pakistan-administered Kashmir, which is claimed by India. This strategic project deepens China's economic and strategic stakes in the region and introduces a major external power's direct involvement in a disputed territory.

August 2019: Revocation of Article 370 in Indian Constitution. The Indian government unilaterally revokes Article 370, stripping Jammu and Kashmir of its semi-autonomous status and reorganizing it into two Union Territories. This decision is accompanied by a prolonged lockdown and communication blackout in the region.

2019: Emergence of The Resistance Front (TRF). This armed group emerges following the Indian government's suspension of Article 370, which stripped Indian-administered Kashmir of its semi-autonomous status. India alleges that TRF is an offshoot or front for Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT).

February 25, 2021: India-Pakistan LoC Ceasefire Agreement Reaffirmed. Both armies announce that they have begun observing a ceasefire along the Line of Control, reaffirming a 2003 understanding.

April 22, 2025: Kashmir Tragedy in Pahalgam. A fictional terrorist attack occurs in Pahalgam, Indian-administered Kashmir, resulting in the loss of 26 tourists' lives. The responsibility is claimed by The Resistance Front (TRF).

April 23, 2025 onwards: Escalation of Tensions, Ceasefire Violations, and Treaty Suspensions.

- Suspension of Indus Waters Treaty (IWT): Following the Pahalgam attack, India announces it will hold the treaty in abeyance or suspend it.
- Suspension of Simla Agreement: Pakistan suspends the 1972 Simla Agreement in protest of India's measures.
- Increased LoC Ceasefire Violations: Cross-border firing along the Line of Control intensifies, with Pakistan reportedly violating the ceasefire multiple times.
- International Strategic Realignment and Responses: Countries like Israel express full support for India after alleged surgical strikes. China, being a close ally of Pakistan due to CPEC investments, calls for peace and stability but expresses regret over India's military action, while also facing its own concerns about protecting CPEC projects and citizens in Pakistan. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) holds a closed-door meeting, urging both sides to exercise restraint and engage in dialogue.

May 07, 2025: Operation Sindoor, a strategic military response by India to the April 22 Pahalgam terror attack that claimed the lives of 26 civilians. This operation was aimed at destroying 9 terror infrastructures located in Muzaffarabad, Kotli, Gulpur, Bhimber, Sialkot, Sarjal, Muridke and Bahawalpur

May 10, 2025: Operation Banyan-um-Marsoos undertaken by Pakistan to targeted at 26 Indian military sites.

The Pahalgam Terror Attack

Sequence of Events and Casualties

The fatal attack in Baisaran meadow in Pahalgam took place on April 22, 2025. Five heavily-armed militants armed with M4 carbines and AK-47s have appeared from thick pine forests that cover the area. Tourists have been attacked in a systematic manner, with assailants first making inquiries about the religion of their victims and beating Hindu men. As many as 26 people were killed and 20 others were injured in the unprovoked firing. The victims were from different states of Maharashtra, Gujarat, Karnataka, West Bengal, Madhya Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Arunachal Pradesh, Bihar, Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir, Kerala, Odisha, Uttar Pradesh, and Tamil Nadu, as well as one foreign national from Nepal. This brutal attack, the deadliest against civilians in India since the 2008 Mumbai attacks, sent shockwaves across the nation and the international community.



Claim and Retraction of Responsibility by The Resistance Front (TRF)

A little known group, named The Resistance Front (TRF), which is believed to be just another name of Lashkar claimed the responsibility for the attack after the Pahalgam massacre in a message spread through Telegram messaging application. In its first claim of responsibility, TRF said the attack was in retaliation for permits issued to "outsiders" by the Indian government after it scrapped Article 370, the provision that gave the region its Muslim-majority character. But only four days later, TRF withdrew the claim. The group claimed its first notification was the "handiwork of Indian state cyberagency with hacked device and tampered communications", with authorities posting the "unauthorized message" on one of its digital platforms following the breach. The unexpected switch and accompanying justification were greeted with disbelief by most analysts. Literature on the credit-claiming behavior of terrorist groups indicates that such retractions, particularly after mass casualty attacks against civilians, are often a public relations strategy employed to mitigate the severe political fallout and potential organizational backlash that such controversial acts can generate. It is thought that members of the Pakistani security establishment may have pushed TRF - an established front of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) - to disown the mass killing in the light of the universal opprobrium in Kashmir, as well as by the international community. The contradictory first claim and denial, and the specious claim of a cyber break-in are only adding to the fog around who the real attackers were and what was the reason behind it.



Actions Taken After the Attack

On April 22, militants attacked tourists in Pahalgam's Baisaran Valley, killing twenty-six and injuring twenty in an onslaught that greatly surprised the region. Two days later, India canceled all of the visas issued to Pakistanis and imposed rigorous travel restrictions. Cross–Line of Control clashes broke out between late April and early May, forcing some villagers to flee and increasing tensions. India tested emergency response systems with air-raid sirens and evacuation exercises on May 1 by sounding alarms and ordering people to seek cover in seven states. On 7 May, New Delhi began Operation Sindoor, aimed at several alleged militant camps across the border. Pakistan retaliated by closing its airspace and increasing artillery fire, and on 10 May began Operation Bunyan al-Marsus, which included drone and ballistic missile attacks on Indian air bases. The fast-paced exchange of attacks and counterattacks. India suspended its participation in the Indus Waters Treaty, while Pakistan halted all bilateral agreements, including the Simla Agreement and trade pacts. Cross-border transport corridors and the special SAARC visa scheme were also put on hold, severing vital civilian links



Domestic and International Condemnation

The savage slaving of the unarmed tourists at Pahalgam had elicited wide expression of anger across India, which felt extremely furious at the clear targetting of civilians and, directly, victims were chosen for the religious belief. Graphic details from the narratives of survivors and the heart-rending images of the victims moved the Indian public and led to demands for strong action by the Indian government. The world community also quickly responded to the atrocities, with many nations and international organizations releasing statements condemning the terrorist attack in strongest language. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) issued a press statement condemning the terrorist attack in Jammu and Kashmir, highlighting that terrorism in all its forms and manifestations is one of the most dangerous threats to international peace and security. The UNSC emphasized the imperative necessity to bring to justice and hold accountable the perps, organizers, financiers, and sponsors of this heinous act of terrorism and called upon all states to cooperate actively with the competent authorities in this respect, as per their obligations under international law and pertinent Security Council resolutions. This widespread international censure underscores the world's appreciation of the gravity of the attack and the concern that the potential for further deterioration in India-Pakistan tensions, between two nuclear powers in an unstable region, would be unleashed.



Causes of Regional Instability and Terrorism

Historical Grievances and Political Disenfranchisement

The Kashmir conflict is deeply rooted in historical grievances that date back to the 1947 partition of British India. The unfulfilled promise of a UN-mandated plebiscite to determine the future of the region has remained a persistent source of resentment among the Kashmiri population. Over the decades, a strong sense of Kashmiri nationalism has emerged, accompanied by feelings of political disenfranchisement and alienation from Indian rule. The alleged rigging of the 1987 state assembly elections is widely considered a significant turning point that fueled widespread disillusionment and provided a major impetus for the eruption of the armed insurgency in the late 1980s. More recently, the Indian government's decision in August 2019 to revoke Article 370 of the Constitution, which had granted special status and a degree of autonomy to Jammu and Kashmir, has been viewed by many Kashmiris as a further erosion of their rights and a violation of trust. This action has been perceived as a move towards greater integration with India at the expense of Kashmiri identity and autonomy, further contributing to the existing sense of political disenfranchisement and fueling anti-India sentiments.





Socio-Economic Conditions and Lack of Opportunities

The extended Jammu and Kashmir turmoil has profoundly undermined the state's economy. Repeated terror strikes and security clampdowns—168 curfews on nine districts of 2016–17 unrest—froze trade, agriculture, and handicraft markets, losing more than ₹16,000 crore in six months. Tourism, which had been generating almost 7 percent of the country's GDP and employing more than 200,000 people, broke down following the April 2025 Pahalgam attack, with 48 key destinations shut down and reservations plummeting by 80 percent in a matter of days. Continual curfews and land acquisition for developments displaced agricultural communities and severed supply chains, ruining livelihoods on the ground. Unemployment at more than 23 percent in mid-2024 and youth unemployment at 17.4 percent, drives them into the shadow economy. School closures deprive students of as many as 60 percent of school days since 2016, damaging human-capital development. This is the backdrop of economic stagnation, social dislocation, and opportunity constraint, under which marginalized youth are susceptible to militant recruitment and the cycle of violence is sustained.



The Role of Pakistan and Cross-Border Terrorism

Pakistan has been long suspected of playing a significant role in sustaining turmoil in Kashmir through its alleged funding support to varied militant organizations in the region, with some prominent groups being LeT and JeM. Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has been suspected of providing logistical support, training, and occasionally even direct orders to these outfits to carry out attacks along the LOC. For the purposes of invoking plausible deniability and possibly evading global condemnation, Pakistan has been alleged to use proxy outfits like The Resistance Front (TRF), which is also a spin-off of LeT, to claim responsibility for attacks. Despite overwhelming evidence and repeated charges by India and other major players, Pakistan has consistently denied any active involvement in sponsoring militancy in Kashmir, claiming that its support is limited to providing moral and diplomatic encouragement to the people of Kashmir in exercising their right of self-determination. This alleged support in global terrorism remains a primary reason for the long-standing instability in Kashmir and a point of dispute in the strained India-Pakistan relationship.



The Rise of Indigenous Militancy and Separatist Ideologies

Apart from the reported outside assistance, Kashmir has also seen the rise and formation of local militant organizations based on secessionist ideologies. The indigenous Kashmiris form these militant organizations, demanding unconditional freedom from Indian occupation or union with Pakistan, indicative of an innate penchant for self-determination. The reason for this indigenous militancy is complex, based on past grievances, political disenfranchisement in the eyes of the natives, and economic and social discontent. These splinterist ideologies have, in certain instances, over time become inextricably linked with more Islamist ideologies, especially among new recruits, driven by transnational jihadist ideology and empathy with Muslim communities beyond the region. The revocation of Article 370 in 2019, viewed by most Kashmiris as an attack on their unique identity and independence, might have helped to even further escalate such feelings and resulted in another upsurge of local militancy. The recent intrusions by groups such as TRF, and their focus on a more local resistance movement, are also evidence of the changing nature of indigenous militancy in the state.



Geopolitical Rivalries and External Influences

The Kashmir issue is not a simple two-way conflict between India and Pakistan but is deeply related to higher geopolitical competition and strategic interests of extra-regional powers. China, with its territorial border touching the territory and ownership of parts of it, has immense strategic interest in keeping the western provinces peaceful and has had extremely close relations with Pakistan by tradition. Meanwhile, at the same time, the United States and the Soviet Union were also performing their main roles in the Cold War by frequently shipping weapons and financial assistance to either India or Pakistan, thereby further complicating the conflict dynamics. In the present geopolitical situation, other regional and global players like Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE have anecdotally also exhibited varying levels of interest and engagement towards the Kashmir dispute, generally in accordance with their own strategic, economic, and religious motives. These external factors and geopolitical rivalries compound the Kashmir dispute settlement and culminate in the region's overall instability in South Asia.





Fuel of Terror in Kashmir

1. Role of Cross-Border Terror Networks, Illicit Financing, and Digital Radicalization

Pakistani militant organizations like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed have proxy organizations in Kashmir that give training, weapons, and strategic guidance through handlers who work across the Line of Control. The organizations feed on unofficial remittance mechanisms like hawala and hundi that allow instant, untraceable monetary transfers for weapon purchases and operative compensation. Moreover, diaspora remittances funneled through Gulf and European NGOs and charitable fronts further blur the destination of money intended for militancy. In the cyber space, cutting-edge propaganda on social-media sites form echo chambers that spurt on recruitment and radicalization of vulnerable young men in the Valley. All of these intermeshed factors together constitute a strong outside support system that continuously energizes and renews insurgent vigor in Kashmir.

2. Encrypted Apps, Hawala Financing, and Cross-Border Handlers Coordinate the Attack through Localized Terror Nodes

Militant groups in Kashmir depend on end-to-end encrypted messaging apps—both bespoke clients and mainstream apps such as Signal and Telegram—to receive operational instructions in real time from Pakistan-based handlers without being intercepted by Indian security agencies. Sustained probes into recent attacks have validated that such encrypted means are the key to coordinating the timing, movement, and target selection of armed groups inside the Valley. From a financial perspective, hawala intermediaries facilitate smooth, untraceable transfers: foreign funds deposited abroad are disbursed in-country by a trusted network of local intermediaries, so that weapons and recruit salaries are provided without interruption. More recently, terrorists have also started using drones and ultralight planes to airdrop small arms caches into secluded forested regions, circumventing conventional land-border paths and adding the resistance and accuracy of localized terror nodes.

3. Emerging Nexus Between Local Criminal Syndicates and Terror Cells

Large-scale "narco-terror" activities have been seen in Jammu & Kashmir, where funds from heroin and phony narcotics smuggling are being used to sustain terrorist activities. Principal criminal groups involved in the trade of drugs have allied themselves with terrorist groups, trading territorial dominion and logistical aid for guns and explosive material. This partnership leverages pre-existing smuggling and distribution networks, utilizing criminal infrastructure—warehouses, transport conveyances, and bribe brokers—to smuggle weapons and drugs both ways across national borders. Drug money frequently is used to purchase arms, recruitment salary, and bribes for local handlers. This crime-terror network significantly increases the financial resources and power of Valley insurgent groups by rendering militancy and organized crime invisible.



International Counter-Terrorism Frameworks

Key UNSC Resolutions on Counter-Terrorism and South Asia

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has established a comprehensive international counter-terrorism framework through various resolutions. A cornerstone of this framework is UNSC Resolution 1373 [2], adopted in 2001 in response to the 9/11 attacks. This resolution mandates all member states to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts, criminalize the provision of support to terrorists, and deny safe havens to those involved in terrorist activities. It also calls on states to cooperate to investigate, detect, arrest, and prosecute individuals involved in terrorism. Resolution 1267[3], adopted in 1999, and its subsequent iterations, concern sanctions against Al-Qaeda and associated individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities. Given the established links of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) to Al-Qaeda, these resolutions are particularly relevant to addressing the activities of these Pakistan-based groups. Other significant UNSC resolutions address issues such as the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters (Resolution 2178)[4], incitement to commit terrorist acts (Resolution 1624)[5], and the importance of international cooperation in criminal matters related to terrorism (Resolution 2322)[6]. These resolutions collectively form a robust international legal framework aimed at countering terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, and are directly applicable to the challenges posed by terrorism emanating from or affecting South Asia.



Other Legal Mandates and Financial Surveillance Mechanisms

The United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee (UNCTC) oversees implementation of global counter-terrorism mandates by reviewing member states' legal frameworks, recommending best practices, and coordinating capacity-building assistance. Through its Executive Directorate (CTED), it conducts country assessments, identifies gaps in counter-terrorism measures, and facilitates technical support-such as legislative drafting workshops and training for law-enforcement and judicial officials. Complementing this, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) monitors national anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorist financing regimes, placing jurisdictions like Pakistan on its "grey list" until deficiencies are remedied. The Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units enables secure exchanges of suspicious-transaction reports, while SWIFT's screening services and the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) empower banks to block or reject illicit transfers. Together, these coordinated legal oversight, financial surveillance, and capacity-building tools significantly raise the cost and risk for non-state actors seeking to move funds or exploit legal loopholes across borders. OFAC enforces U.S. sanctions and has taken action against entities in South Asia for violations. In 2023, Godfrey Phillips India Limited faced a settlement of \$332,500 for exporting tobacco to North Korea through indirect channels, thereby violating U.S. sanctions.

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Regional Counterterrorism Efforts and Collaboration

South Asia uses a range of regional cooperation mechanisms to counter terrorism through information-sharing, coordination, and legal harmonization. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization's Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) brings China, India, Pakistan, and other members together in exercises, intelligence sharing, and legal standards to break up transnational militant networks. Simultaneously, SAARC's Convention on Suppression of Terrorism and the Additional Protocol offer tools for extradition, mutual legal aid, and policy coordination. Long-standing political animosity and profound distrust between India and Pakistan have, however, consistently stalled operational cooperation, as seen in boycotted summits and halted data exchanges in the aftermath of cross-border incidents. More globally, the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) enrolls more than two dozen countries, including India, in developing best-practice toolkits for prevention, prosecution, and rehabilitation. ASEAN's Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism enhances legal arrangements and capacity building among Southeast Asian nations. Through shared expertise and resources, these institutions aim to limit safe havens and transit routes for terror networks while bilateral tensions contain full enforcement.



Capacity Building, CVE, and Economic Levers in South Asia

South Asian countries are increasingly using international capacity-building and preventive measures in addition to economic levers to counter terrorism. Guided by United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, regional CVE programs—deradicalization workshops, judges' training, and prison rehabilitation courses—have been tested in India, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka to counter radicalization before it becomes violent. Simultaneously, the G7's focus on disrupting web-based hiring and financial intelligence sharing has triggered joint drills among financial regulators in South Asia, strengthening suspicious-transaction reporting and cross-border compliance. Economically, India and Pakistan have both employed the WTO Security Exceptions to defend temporary trade restrictions amid interdeterrence crises, leveraging tariffs as diplomatic leverage instead of military action. In addition to the WTO, IMF and World Bank lending in the region now also consistently applies antimoney-laundering and governance conditions, pushing member countries to improve legal systems and enforcement. Through combining CVE capacity building with trade pressure, South Asia uses non-military measures to dissuade extremist networks and build resilience.



Security Partnerships and Infrastructure Protection

Maritime and military collaborations provide practical deterrents and rapid response capacities against seaborne and cross-border threats. The annual Malabar naval exercises (India, U.S., Japan, Australia) enhance interoperability in patrols and interdiction of illicit shipments across the Indian Ocean. INTERPOL's counter-terrorism projects support cross-border policing, forensics, and arrest warrants under unified databases, while regional centers coordinate joint operations in hotspot areas. On the economic corridor front, the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor incorporates a dedicated security architecture—special military divisions, naval task forces, and intelligence cells—to safeguard infrastructure and personnel, reflecting the strategic imperative to shield high-value projects from insurgent disruption. Through these security and protection frameworks, states project power, defend critical supply lines, and deny terrorists the mobility essential to their operations.





From Fragmentation to Fusion

The diagram illustrates a critical imbalance: while terror networks operate with high coordination. adaptability, and cross-border connectivity, existing counter-frameworks remain fragmented, unevenly enforced, and politically constrained. Dark black arrows highlight the strength and synchronization of terror-fueling mechanisms like illicit financing, transnational syndicates, and digital radicalization. In contrast, the light grey arrows between counterframeworks symbolize the weak interlinkages, limited intelligence sharing, and often siloed operations among nations and institutions.

To address these vulnerabilities, the UNSC must innovate, innovate to enhance counterterrorism and effectively stop its counterpart. The delegates must bring up their own solutions, which can practically counter the current situation, while building for longevity too. Ultimately, global counter-terrorism must move from fragmented reactions to preemptive, synchronized deterrence.

SHISHRAU MAR Carson

The Geopolitical Crisis

The geopolitical landscape before the Pahalgam attack:

Prior to the Pahalgam disaster in April 2025, South Asia's geopolitical map was dominated by a delicate dance of cooperation and competition between major regional stakeholders. India and Pakistan held a tenuous peace, supported by the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty, which demarcated control over the Indus River system between the two countries. In spite of persistent tensions regarding Kashmir and cross-border terrorism, the treaty ensured water-sharing and averting full-scale wars. India-Bangladesh relations were marked by strong economic and infrastructural collaboration, with the Maitree Super Thermal Power Project—a 1,320 MW coal-based power plant in Rampal—and the Akhaura-Agartala rail connection, which helped to facilitate connectivity between India's northeast states and Bangladesh. But China's expanding presence in the area, from developments such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to its rising investments in Bangladesh, announced Beijing's plans to extend its strategic reach in South Asia at India's expense, undermining India's historical sphere of influence. These trends highlighted a fine balance of power, with countries walking a tightrope of historical resentment and new alignments in a region of immense strategic value.



Immediate Aftermath

The April 22, 2025, terrorist attack in Pahalgam, Jammu and Kashmir, that killed 26 civilians was a major jump in local tensions. The perpetrators, members of The Resistance Front (TRF), a breakaway group of Lashkar-e-Taiba, used advanced tactics, such as the use of encrypted messaging apps and body cameras, suggesting high levels of coordination and intent to create communal strife. NIA investigations found digital traces from safe houses in Muzaffarabad and Karachi, pointing to support from Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). An unusual spike in the demand for high-resolution satellite imagery of the Pahalgam district was noted two months before the attack, and this coincided with the use of a Pakistani geospatial company suspected of past illegal activities. New Delhi took a series of bold and escalatory steps that fundamentally shifted regional dynamics. The Indian government cancelled the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty, a symbolic and strategic action signaling a departure from conventional restraint. At the same time, it shut the Attari–Wagah Integrated Check Post and withdrew Most Favoured Nation status for Pakistan, suspending bilateral trade and economic interaction.

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Pakistani diplomats, particularly those in defense and intelligence roles, were expelled, and the diplomatic corps in New Delhi was reduced by nearly 50%, leading Islamabad to mirror these actions, sever formal dialogue mechanisms, and place all bilateral treaties, including the Simla Agreement, under review.

On the military front, India fortified its western borders, mobilized artillery and air defense units, and increased combat patrols in border districts of Jammu & Kashmir. Aerial surveillance intensified, with Heron Mk II drones conducting reconnaissance flights deep into Pakistan-administered territory, particularly over suspected terror launchpads in Muzaffarabad, Kotli, and Bhimber. India also greenlit precision-targeting protocols, while strategic fuel and ammunition reserves were activated near frontline airbases.

Globally, New Delhi signed swift intelligence-sharing deals with the United States, Britain, and France, to gain access to high-res satellite imagery and real-time signals intelligence. The UN Security Council held an emergency closed-door meeting on April 26, but China's refusal to allow direct condemnation of Pakistan thwarted a collective resolution. The European Union called for de-escalation but also suspended several bilateral development talks with Pakistan. The U.S., Germany, Canada, and Australia issued travel advisories against the visit to conflict-ridden regions in northern India and Pakistan.



Meanwhile, Pakistan placed its military on high alert, activating forward-operating bases and accelerating procurement of Fateh-II tactical missile systems and electronic warfare kits from China. The People's Liberation Army reportedly supplied advanced ECM (electronic countermeasure) kits, drone jammers, and early-warning radar support. Pakistan's National Command Authority convened multiple times between April 24 and May 4 to review nuclear force posture and regional strike-readiness scenarios. Intelligence sources indicated that Karachi port saw an uptick in Chinese arms shipments, including drone swarms and long-range rocket artillery.

India, for its part, fast-tracked orders for Rafale fighter support kits, resupplied Akash SAM batteries, and deployed Tejas aircraft to forward bases. Emergency wartime exercises were also held in Rajasthan and Punjab involving joint command units from the Army, Air Force, and paramilitary forces. West Asian, Central Asian, and ASEAN diplomatic missions were directed to initiate a concerted campaign to reveal Pakistan's suspected proxy militancy, targeting UNHRC, G20, and BRICS lobbying. By May 6, the subcontinent reached its most unstable point in decades, with diplomatic bridges burning and tensions at the border escalating towards all-out confrontation.



Operation Sindoor

Operation Sindoor was a small but well-planned military action undertaken by the Indian Armed Forces on May 7, 2025, as a direct retaliation for the April 22 terrorist attack in Pahalgam. Targeting known terrorist threats along the border, the operation targeted nine large militant camps of Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed in Pakistan's Punjab province and Pakistan-administered Kashmir. They aimed at key locations such as Muzaffarabad, Kotli, Bahawalpur, and Muridke. The Indian Air Force executed the attacks using Rafale warplanes, BrahMos missiles, SkyStriker drones, and SCALP and Hammer precision-guided missiles. The operation lasted approximately 23 minutes and included the use of advanced deception tactics like imitating unmanned vehicles to mislead enemy air defense systems. Domestic technologies such as Akash surface-to-air missiles and D4 air defense networks with minimal response time. Operation Sindoor was designed to be short, accurate, and devoid of civilian casualties. There were rumors about precision strikes hitting Pakistan's nuclear bases, although any nuclear leakage was denied by the IAEA.

Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance were conducted in real time by using Heron Mk II drones, which guided and confirmed successful strikes. The operation was reported to have led to the neutralization of over 100 terror operatives and destruction of critical infrastructure critical to future operations. India framed the operation as a calibrated act of self-defense, demonstrating strategic restraint while announcing its red lines against cross-border terrorism. It was designed to undermine terrorist capability without escalating into greater conflict. The accuracy and self-control displayed through Operation Sindoor were asserted as significant progress in India's evolving doctrine on counter-terrorism and its ability to wage high-impact military action with minimal footprint.

Retaliation and operation Bunyan Marsus

In the instantaneous aftermath of India's Operation Sindoor on May 7, 2025, the region experienced an unprecedented surge in hostilities. Indian air defense systems shot down and disabled over 600 Pakistani drones that were conducting strikes against border outposts in Punjab and Jammu & Kashmir. Both armies intensified artillery exchanges across the Line of Control, particularly in sectors like Kupwara, Baramulla, and Uri. Diplomatic relations also deteriorated further as both of them expelled dozens of the other's diplomats and suspended key treaties. Beijing covertly increased shipments of Fateh-II missiles and electronic warfare kits to Islamabad while citing restraint publicly.

On 10 May, Pakistan launched Operation Bunyān Mārsūs, a swift, multi-domain counterattack. Pakistan deployed Fateh-II short-range ballistic missiles on Indian airbases and logistics hubs in Punjab, Rajasthan, and Jammu & Kashmir, followed by kamikaze drones on radar facilities and ammunition dumps. The Pakistan Air Force conducted coordinated sorties, engaging Indian planes in the biggest air battles in South Asia since 1971. Indian airdefense radar and communications channels were jammed by electronic warfare troops and ground defense batteries picked off incoming Indian drones. Civilian targets were avoided mostly, but the mission demonstrated that Pakistan was capable of combining missile, drone, air, and cyber resources.

From Precision Strikes to the Brink

In the subsequent days after these operations, both armies were at the edge of continued escalation. India's swift commitment of more Tejas light fighters, augmented Akash airdefense batteries, and extended Heron Mk II UAV patrols increased the risk of miscalculation at the Line of Control, where normal artillery exchanges could rapidly escalate into wider battles. Pakistan's steepened imports of Fateh-II ballistic missiles, kamikaze drone clouds, and upgraded electronic-warfare packages highlighted its willingness to counter any Indian advance; concurrent combined exercises with the Bangladeshi and Turkish navies in the north Arabian Sea indicated nascent regional balancing that might attract outside allies. Diplomatic breakdowns—Suspension of treaty institutions, mutual diplomatic expulsions, and public denunciations at multilateral gatherings-deteriorated classical crisis-management channels. At the same time, steppedup cyber-espionage and counter-intrusion efforts targeting key infrastructure opened a covert front where a jarring hack or false-flag event could elicit kinetic reprisal. With both capitals subject to internal pressure to show firmness, even a lone wayward missile or unconfirmed drone penetration held the potential to rekindle all-out war, converting an isolated tit-for-tat into a long-term high-intensity conflict



Post-Pahalgam Geopolitical Realignment in South Asia

As global powers realign, the stability of South Asia now rests in a precarious web of nascent realignments and diplomatic initiatives. Both the United States and United Kingdom have each come forward with proposals to facilitate high-level dialogue and joint communiques calling for restraint, while Russia has advanced the idea of a trilateral security dialogue under the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation umbrella. France, weighing solidarity with India's right of self-defence and back-channel de-escalation diplomacy, follows the European Union in looking for humanitarian corridors to alleviate the suffering of civilians along the conflict-torn border. At the UN, voices advocating for an unbiased investigation ring alongside an OIC meeting that stressed Pakistan's security interests without necessarily condemning New Delhi. In the Gulf, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have subtly pushed Islamabad towards moderation while negotiating economic relief for Kashmiri societies. Tokyo and Canberra have together reminded the two nuclear-armed neighbours of their Non-Proliferation Treaty commitments, while Turkey and Azerbaijan have openly reaffirmed Pakistan's right to retaliate against aggression. On India's flank, Bangladesh under Muhammad Yunus has pivoted toward deeper naval cooperation with Pakistan and welcomed Chinese infrastructure investments, signaling a gradual realignment away from New Delhi's traditional sphere. China itself, despite officially decrying the Pahalgam atrocity, has lent diplomatic backing to Pakistan's narrative of self-defense and called for an impartial international investigation. Against this background, even a single mistake-whether an errant drone, a cyberattack, or a fiery public utterance-would threaten to revive full-scale war, having the region teetering on the brink of conflict once more.



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Treaty Weaponisation

Definition and Scope: Treaty weaponization refers to the strategic use of bilateral or multilateral treaties by states to gain advantages or penalize adversaries, often by invoking, suspending, or manipulating treaty clauses. This practice can exacerbate conflicts, undermine diplomatic relations, and threaten regional stability. In the context of terrorism and warfare, such as the 2025 Pahalgam attack in Kashmir, treaty weaponization can amplify tensions, particularly when critical agreements like the Indus Waters Treaty or Simla Agreement are involved.

Significance for International Peace: The manipulation of treaties can destabilize regions by disrupting essential resources (e.g., water) or escalating military tensions. For the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), tasked with maintaining international peace and security under the UN Charter, such actions are relevant when they risk broader conflict or humanitarian crises. The UNSC may need to address these issues through resolutions, peacekeeping, or mediation to prevent escalation.

Case Study (a): Indus Water Treaty

Background: Signed in 1960, the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) governs water sharing of the Indus River system between India and Pakistan, mediated by the World Bank. India controls the Eastern Rivers (Beas, Ravi, Sutlej), while Pakistan controls the Western Rivers (Indus, Chenab, Jhelum). The treaty includes mechanisms for data-sharing and dispute resolution to ensure equitable access. Weaponization

Timeline:

• Pre-2025: Periodic disputes over dam constructions (e.g., Kishanganga project) strained relations but were managed through bilateral talks.

• Post-Pahalgam (April 2025): Following the terrorist attack in Pahalgam, killing 26 civilians, India suspended data-sharing under the IWT, citing national security concerns. Pakistan threatened to withdraw from the treaty, escalating diplomatic tensions. Regional and

Humanitarian Impact: The suspension disrupts hydropower and irrigation, affecting millions in Pakistans agrarian economy. Downstream communities face water shortages, risking food insecurity and displacement. Escalated tensions could lead to military confrontations, further destabilizing South Asia.

UNSC Relevant Precedents: UNSC Resolution 2139 (2014) emphasizes protecting civilians in armed conflicts, applicable to humanitarian impacts of water disputes. Water security as a peace issue has been discussed in UNSC open debates.



Case Study (b): The Simla Agreement

Background: Signed in 1972 after the India-Pakistan War, the Simla Agreement established the Line of Control (LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir and committed both nations to resolve disputes peacefully through bilateral negotiations. It aimed to stabilize relations and prevent escalation. Weaponization

Timeline:

• Pre-2025: Violations of LoC ceasefires were common, but diplomatic channels remained open.

• Post-Pahalgam (April 2025): Pakistan suspended LoC communications and invoked the agreement to justify cross-border firings, claiming counter-terrorism measures. India accused Pakistan of violating the agreements' peaceful resolution clauses.

Regional and Security Impact: Increased militarization along the LoC has led to civilian displacement and heightened risks of armed conflict. The breakdown of diplomatic channels undermines regional stability, potentially drawing in external actors.

UNSC Relevant Precedents: UNSC Resolution 47 (1948) addressed Kashmirs ceasefire lines, emphasizing peace restoration. UNSC discussions on counter-terrorism (e.g., Resolution 1373, 2001) provide context for balancing security and sovereignty.



The 2021 LOC ceasefire accord

The 2021 ceasefire accord along the Line of Control (LoC), which recommitted both India and Pakistan to the 2003 ceasefire agreement, has come under severe strain following the recent events. Reports from various sources indicate repeated violations of this accord by Pakistan after the Pahalgam attack. These violations, involving small arms fire and artillery shelling, have led to civilian casualties and heightened tensions in the border regions. Due to persistent violations, India has mulled over a withdrawal from the 2021 agreement. The collapse of this ceasefire, which had provided a period of relative calm along the volatile border, carries significant implications for regional stability and the safety of civilians living in these areas.

Paving Pathways for Peace

South Asia stands at a critical crossroads, where aspirations for peace are increasingly challenged by complex, evolving threats rooted in extremism, digital radicalization, and fragile interstate relations. Despite being home to one of the world's most diverse and populous regions, South Asia continues to grapple with persistent security dilemmas that transcend national borders—ranging from the proliferation of cross-border terror networks to the exploitation of digital platforms for youth radicalization. In this context, regional cooperation is not a choice but a necessity. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), once envisioned as a catalyst for peace and integration, now faces the urgent task of revitalizing its mandate to address these 21st-century threats. With digital footprints becoming central to modern counter-terrorism efforts, and financial channels being misused for illicit activities, there is a compelling need to reassess regional frameworks, build trust among neighbors, and align strategic countermeasures. "Paving Pathways for Peace" thus emerges not just as a diplomatic ideal but as an actionable roadmap grounded in technology, collaboration, and regional solidarity.





Third-party mediation

Effective third-party mediation in the Kashmir dispute hinges on learning from past efforts, respecting the Simla Agreement's emphasis on bilateral talks, and creatively leveraging regional and global actors without infringing on sovereignty. It is up to the delegates to opt-in or opt-out for third party mediation in the area, but due to the topic's massive potential to make or break a solution, directions for proper mediation strategies will be given.

Kashmir's history of UN involvement via the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) between 1948 and 1972 shows that while early truce supervision helped prevent full-scale war, India's later insistence on bilateralism under the Simla Agreement limits the UN's direct role. Similarly, China's role through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation offers neutral ground for Track 1.5 or Track 2 dialogues, given Beijing's strategic ties to both capitals. The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation can lend moral weight in support of Kashmiri voices, so long as it avoids framing Kashmir purely as an India-Pakistan proxy conflict.



The Shishukunj Model United Nations 2025 UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

Any mediation must begin with limited, thematic mandates that parties can embrace without fear of compromising core positions. Building on Shimla Agreement precedents, mediators might start with issues like cross-LoC family reunifications or joint management of essential resources. These mandates create early wins, opening space for more sensitive conversations later. Time-bound review points every three to six months, as recommended by UN mediation guidelines, help maintain momentum without overwhelming negotiators. Embedding "escalation triggers" within the mandate, such as automatic ministerial-level consultations if technical talks stall, ensures structured progression.

Modern mediation can no longer rely solely on closed-door diplomacy. Creating a digital fusion cell staffed by OSINT analysts can track online radicalization trends, map terror financing in real time, and provide negotiators with actionable intelligence. Financial forensics to trace hawala and cryptocurrency flows can expose funding routes that undermine peace. Hybrid facilitation, combining international mediators with respected local figures, such as former Kashmiri civil society leaders, ensures that agreements reflect ground realities and enjoy local buy-in.

Mediators should sequence confidence-building measures before delving into thorny political questions. Early steps might include reopening pilgrimage routes, resuming limited trade caravans, or launching joint environmental monitoring of shared rivers. Empirical studies show that such incremental cooperation generates "goodwill credits" that negotiators can draw upon when discussing troop reductions or administrative autonomy.

Durable solutions require voices beyond official negotiators. Incorporating women's groups, youth representatives, and civil-society organizations in parallel "people's forums" fosters broader legitimacy. These forums can surface community-level concerns—like access to education and healthcare—and feed them into the formal mediation process, reducing the risk of agreements collapsing under grassroots opposition.

By combining selective mediator choice, focused mandates, data-driven methods, strategic sequencing, and inclusive participation, third-party efforts can move beyond past deadlocks and chart a pragmatic path toward peace in Kashmir.







Paving Pathways for De-escalation

Guidelines for De-escalation -

De-escalation in nuclear-capable, conflict-prone dyads like India and Pakistan cannot hinge on verbal restraint or symbolic gestures alone. It requires structured, pre-negotiated frameworks that bind military behavior to a set of agreed protocols, with historical precedent demonstrating that codified restraint mechanisms, rather than informal backchannels, offer



For instance, the 1972 Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, which established notification, maneuver, and identification protocols for naval encounters, proved successful in reducing accidental escalations during the Cold War. Similarly, the 1999 Lahore Declaration between India and Pakistan committed both sides to advance notification of missile tests and the establishment of nuclear confidence-building measures (CBMs). Though imperfect, these agreements created frameworks that lowered the margin for miscalculation.

A structured de-escalation mechanism in South Asia must therefore rest on reciprocal restraint protocols—pre-agreed conduct for periods of heightened tension. These can include "no first artillery use" declarations along the LoC, advance 48-hour notification of troop movements within 10 km of the ceasefire line, and temporary demilitarization of conflict flashpoints during joint review periods. These protocols should be time-bound (e.g., 90-day renewable windows), reviewed in the presence of neutral observers (such as under the Shanghai Cooperation Organization), and governed by mutually accepted escalation thresholds (e.g., shelling incidents above a certain damage or casualty threshold would trigger an emergency review).

Such frameworks must be embedded within existing military infrastructure, particularly the Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) hotlines, ensuring that de-escalation is procedurally managed by institutional channels, not left to political rhetoric. Additionally, provisions for emergency digital verification—such as using satellite or drone footage co-verified by third-party nations—can prevent false-flag claims or retaliatory missteps.

In sum, effective de-escalation is not an abstract diplomatic ideal but a technical process of limiting the risk of unintended war. When built on precedent, accountability, and practical verification, such mechanisms do not weaken national security—they strengthen it by preserving space for diplomacy when it is needed most.



Glossary

OCR

Optical Character Recognition (OCR) is a technology that converts printed or handwritten text into machine-readable text. It is widely used for digitizing documents, extracting text from images, and automating data entry processes.

NIA

The National Investigation Agency (NIA) is India's central agency tasked with investigating and combating terrorism and threats to national security. It handles major cases involving sovereignty, security, and integrity of the country.

SAM

A Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) is a missile launched from the ground or a ship to intercept and destroy aircraft or other missiles. It is a key element of air defense systems.

UAV

An Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), commonly called a drone, is an aircraft without a human pilot onboard. Controlled remotely or autonomously, UAVs are used for surveillance, reconnaissance, and military operations.

Most Favoured Nation

Most Favoured Nation (MFN) is a trade principle where a country grants another the same trade benefits (e.g., low tariffs) as its most favored trading partner. It promotes fair and equal trade under international agreements.

Hawala

Hawala is an informal, trust-based system for transferring money, common in South Asia and the Middle East. It operates outside traditional banking, relying on a network of brokers to move funds without physical cash movement.

Hundi

A hundi is a traditional financial instrument in South Asia, similar to a promissory note or bill of exchange. It is used in informal banking to transfer money or settle debts.

Narco-terror

Narco-terror refers to the use of drug trafficking profits to finance terrorist activities. It involves links between drug cartels and terrorist groups, blending narcotics and insurgency.

Treaty Weaponisation

Treaty weaponisation is the strategic use or manipulation of international treaties to gain military, political, or diplomatic advantages. This can involve exploiting terms, suspending obligations, or leveraging agreements in conflicts.



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